Sequential allocation is a simple allocation mechanism in which agents are given pre-specified turns and each agents gets the most preferred item that is still available. It has long been known that sequential allocation is not strategyproof.
Introduction
A simple but popular mechanism to allocate indivisible items is sequential allocation [2, 3, 6, 7, 11, 12, 14] . In sequential allocation, a sequence specifies the turns of the agents. For example, for sequence 1212, agents 1 and 2 alternate with agent 1 taking the first turn. Agent take turns according to the sequence and are given the the most preferred item that has not yet been allocated. Sequential allocation is an ordinal mechanism since the outcome only depends on the ordinal preferences of agents over items. Nevertheless, it is a standard assumption in the literature that agents have underlying additive utilities for the items.
It has long been known that sequential allocation is not strategyproof in particular when agents do not have consecutive turns. This motivates the natural problem of computing best responses (also referred to as manipulations). Kohler and Chandrasekaran [12] presented a polynomial-time algorithm to compute the optimal manipulation of an agent when there are two agents and the sequence is alternating (121212..). Bouveret and Lang [3] initiated further work on manipulation of sequential allocation. They showed that it can be checked in polynomial time whether an agent can be allocated a certain subset of items. Since there can be exponential number of subsets, the result does not show that finding the optimal response is polynomial-time solvable as well.
Results. We on focus on computing best responses (or manipulations) under sequential allocation. Recently, Bouveret and Lang [4, 5] presented a polynomialtime algorithm to compute a best response of an agent and claimed that (1) their algorithm correctly finds an optimal response and (2) each best response results in the same allocation for the manipulator. The result has been cited in a number of works [see e.g., 1, 10, 13, 8] . We first show that both claims are false by the help of an example. We then show that in fact the problem of computing a best response is NP-complete. The result has some interesting consequences since many allocation rules are based on sequential allocation and for all such rules, there cannot be a general polynomial-time to manipulate the mechanism unless P=NP. Since manipulation by even one agent is NP-hard, the NP-hardness also implies a number of NP-hardness results by Bouveret and Lang [4, 5] on coalitional manipulation.
Preliminaries
We consider the setting in which we have N = {1, . . . , n} a set of agents, O = {o 1 , . . . , o m } a set of items, and the preference profile ≻= (≻ 1 , . . . , ≻ n ) specifies for each agent i his complete, strict, and transitive preference ≻ i over O.
Each agent may additionally express a cardinal utility function u i consistent with ≻ i :
We will assume that each item is positively valued, i.e, u i (o) > 0 for all i ∈ N and o ∈ O. The set of all utility functions consistent with ≻ i is denoted by U (≻ i ). We will denote by U (≻) the set of all utility profiles u = (u 1 , . . . , u n ) such that u i ∈ U (≻ i ) for each i ∈ N . When we consider agents' valuations according to their cardinal utilities, then we will assume additivity, that is
At times, we will present an assignment in matrix form. An assignment is an n × m matrix [p(i)(o j )] 1≤i≤n,1≤j≤m such that for all i ∈ N , and o j ∈ O, p(i)(h j ) ∈ {0, 1}; and for all j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, i∈N p(i)(o j ) = 1. An agent i gets item o j if and only if p(i)(o j ) = 1. Each row p(i) = (p(i)(h 1 ), . . . , p(i)(o m )) represents the allocation of agent i.
We say that utilities are lexicographic if for each agent
Example 1. Consider the setting in which N = {1, 2}, O = {o 1 , o 2 , o 3 , o 4 }, the preferences of agents are
Then for the policy 1221, agent 1 gets {o 1 , o 4 } while 2 gets {o 2 , o 3 }. The assignment resulting from sequential allocation (SA) can be represented as follows.
Computing a Best Response: Case of Three or More Agents
In the next example, we highlight that for n ≥ 3, the best response algorithm of Bouveret and Lang [4, 5] does not work and that an optimal manipulation may not result in a unique allocation. Let the sequence be 1231. Now according to the best response algorithm of Bouveret and Lang [4] , the best response is one in which agent 1 gets {a, d} which can even be achieved by the truthful report. The reason the algorithm of Bouveret and Lang [4, 5] returns the truthful report as the best response is because it first construct allocation {a} and checks that it is achievable; then it checks whether {a, b} is achievable and finds that it is not achievable; then it checks whether {a, c} is achievable and finds that it is not achievable, and finally the algorithm terminates when it is found that {a, d} is achievable for agent 1 via the truthful report.
Let us assume that agent 1 misreports so that the reported preference profile is as follows:
Under the misreport, agent 1 gets {b, c}. Agent 1 cannot get {a, b} or {a, c} which are not achievable. But he can get {a, d} or {b, c} depending on what he reports. Now which one is better clearly depends on the actual utilities and not just on the ordinal preferences. For example if the utilities are 3.1, 3, 2 and 1 then {b, c} is preferred over {a, d} and hence {a, d} is not the best possible achievable allocation for agent 1 which means that Moreover, if the utilities are 4, 3, 2, 1, then agent 1 is completely indifferent between the allocations {a, d} and {b, c}. This proves that there may be best responses that do not yield a unique allocation for the manipulator when the number of non-manipulators is 2 or more (i.e., when the total number of agents is 3 or more).
The example above simply shows that algorithm of Bouveret and Lang [4, 5] does not necessarily compute a best response that gives maximum utility to the agent. It does not settle the complexity of computing a best response. Next, we show that the problem is NP-hard. The reduction involves a similar high-level idea as that of the result by Aziz et al. [1] that manipulating the probabilistic serial (PS) mechanism is NP-hard. However, the reduction requires new gadgets. Also note that the NP-hardness result for the PS mechanism does not directly imply a similar result for sequential allocation. Similarly, NPhardness to manipulate sequential allocation does not imply NP-hardness to manipulate the PS mechanism. Theorem 1. Computing a best response for the sequential allocation mechanism is NP-complete.
Proof. To show hardness, we prove that the following problem (Best Response) is NP-complete: given an assignment setting and a utility function u : O → N specifying the utility of each item for the manipulator (agent 1) and a target utility T , can the manipulator specify preferences such that the utility for his allocation under the sequential allocation rule is at least T ? The problem Best Response is clearly in NP. The outcome with respect to the reported preference can be computed by simulating sequential allocation. The utility achieved by the agent can be computed by adding the utility of the items allocated to the agent.
We reduce from a restricted NP-complete version of 3SAT where each literal appears exactly twice in the formula. The problem remains NPcomplete [ Lemma 1, 9] . Given such a 3SAT instance F = (X, C) where X = {x 1 , . . . , x |X| } is the set of variables and C the set of clauses, we build an instance of Best Response where the manipulator can obtain utility ≥ T if and only if the formula is satisfiable. We will denote by L the set of literals.
The set of agents is composed of
• Agent 1 the manipulator/responder; and
• agents a To summarize, the agent set is:
The set of items O is as follows:
• 
We view the sequential allocation process as follows. The preferences are built in a way so that the agents go through |X| choice rounds corresponding to variables x 1 , . . . , x |X| and then |C| clause rounds corresponding to c 1 , . . . , c |C| with one final round called the collection round in wich High-level Idea. The items that agent 1 potentially gets in each round have considerably more utility than items he is supposed to get in latter rounds. If agent 1 does not get the items systematically, they will be taken by other agents and and then agent 1 will not be able to make up for the loss of not getting those items first. This ensures that in each round agent 1 makes a choice between the items corresponding to the positive and negative literals of a variable. There is negligible difference between the utility of the items corresponding to the literal and its negation (for example o ¬x ) so what is important is that agent chooses one of the items corresponding to the literals. If agent 1 makes the correct choices, then it will ensure that it gets a most preferred items corresponding to each of the clause items. We want to show that there is a satisfiable assignment if and only if agent 1 gets utility T . This is only possible if agent 1 sets the choice variables in a consistent way and manages to get the most preferred clause item for each clause which is only possible if each clause is set to be true which in turn is only possible if the agents corresponding to the negation of the literal in the clause do not get the clause items. The way the reduction works is also illustrated in Example 3 right after the proof. Choice Round. This choice round is composed of two back to back sub rounds in which agent 1 has to choose a literal corresponding to a variable and then do this again. The sequence in choice round i for variable x i is as follows
The preferences relevant for the choice round are as follows. Each literal agent likes items corresponding to the negation of the literal.
For each variable x i , agent 1 has the following preferences
For each variable x i , the preferences of the related agents are as follows:
22 ¬xi
Any items that are not in the preference list of an agent are considered to be far down in the preference list. Note the difference in the preferences of the negative versus the positive literals: the positive literal agents have a dummy item as the least preferred item relevant to the picking in the choice round whereas the negative literal agents have the consistency items as the least preferred items relevant to the picking in the choice round.
The preferences agents in the choice round are made in such a way to that agent 1 is compelled to make consistent choice so that it not only gets literal items corresponding to its choice but also one if its most two preferred consistency Table 1 and Table 2 Table 3 and Table 4 .
Clause For agent 1, the relevant preferences in the clause round are:
For a variable x, if x is a literal in the clause, the relevant preferences in this round are:
For a variable x, if ¬x is a literal in the clause, the relevant preferences in this round are:
Please note that the items h In the clause round, any literal that is not satisfied, the agent corresponding to literal gets a clause item. So for example if literal x is false, then a Since each literal occurs exactly twice in the formula, note that as long as 1 makes a consistent choice, there will be another clause c ′ in which literal x is present and if x is set to true, then a 2 ¬x will get h 3 xi and hence 1 will be able to get o c ′ . Note that after the clause rounds all the consistency items are already consumed so the agent 1 can hope to get all the top clause items if they were not already taken in the clause rounds. • For any variable x i , agent 1's preferences over the consistency items are as follows:
The utility is set as follows:
• All items that agent 1 is considering getting in a round (choice or clause)
are considerably more preferred than the corresponding items in the latter rounds.
• The utilities are set in a way so that as long as agent 1 gets two items corresponding to a variable, at least one top choice consistency items in each round and his target clause item in each clause round, agent 1 gets utility at least T .
Based on construction of the choice and clause rounds, we are in a position to prove a series of claims. The claims show that agent 1 gets utility at least T if and only if there is a satisfying truth assignment.
Example 3. We illustrate the reduction in the proof of Theorem 1. For the following SAT formula, we illustrate how we build an allocation setting with the agent set, item set, preferences of agents and the picking sequence.
The picking sequence is as follows Table 9 : Clause round 1
Computing a Best Response: Case of Two Agents
The insights and results of Bouveret and Lang [5] in their Section 3.1 and 3.2 still hold for n = 2. For the sake of completeness, we outline the main arguments. We can ascertain that for n = 2, not only is there is a linear-time algorithm to compute a best response but each best response results in the same allocation irrespective of the cardinal utilities consistent with the ordinal preferences.
We present a series of lemmas.
Lemma 1 (From Proposition 7 by Bouveret and Lang [3] ). Let the set of items S = {a 1 , . . . , a m1 } be such that a 1 ≻ 2 a 2 · · · ≻ 2 a m1 . If S is achievable by 1 for some preference report, then agent 1 can achieve S by reporting
Proof. Consider any report ≻ ′ 1 such that the result of (≻ ′ 1 , ≻ 2 is that agent 1 gets S. Then changing ≻ ′ 1 to ≻ ′′ 1 in which items in O \ S are moved to items after S does not change the outcome. At each stage when agent i ∈ {1, 2} picks, the most preferred available item of i remains the same.
We now show that if agent 1 can achieve S, he can do so by reporting a 1 ≻ 1 a 2 · · · a m1 ≻ 1 {all other items}. Assume that agent 1 does not get S by report a 1 ≻ 1 a 2 · · · a m1 · · · ≻ 1 {all other items}. We show that agent 1 cannot get S by any other report. Let us consider the earliest stage in which agent 2 gets an item from S. Let the item be a i in stage ℓ. This means that by stage ℓ agent 2 did not any items from {a 1 , . . . , a i−1 } which agent 1 got. Note that by stage ℓ, agent 1 gets i − 1 picks and agent 2 gets ℓ − (i − 1) = ℓ = i + 1 picks. Note that {a : a ≻ 2 a i } is the union of {a 1 , . . . , a i−1 } and the items in O \ S that agent 2 got before stage ℓ. The most preferred ℓ items of agent 2 include i items from S and ℓ − 1 − (i − 1) = ℓ − i other items. Since agent 2 has ℓ − i + 1 picks, he will be able to get one item from {a 1 , . . . , a i } irrespective of what agent 1 reports because by stage ℓ, agent 1 has only i − 1 picks.
items S = {a 1 , . . . , a m1 } be such that a 1 ≻ 2 a 2 · · · ≻ 2 a m1 . Then the following conditions are equivalent:
(i) S is achievable.
(ii) agent 1 can achieve S by reporting a 1 ≻ 1 a 2 ≻ 1 · · · a m1 · · · ≻ 1 {all other items}.
(iii) when agent 1 reports a 1 ≻ 1 a 2 ≻ 1 · · · a m1 · · · ≻ 1 {all other items}, for each picking stage ℓ in which agent 1 picks his i-th, all the ℓ − i items allocated to 2 by stage ℓ more preferred than a i .
Proof. (ii) trivially implies (i). Lemma 1 shows that (ii) implies (i).
We prove that (iii) implies (ii) Let us assume that for each picking stage ℓ in which agent 1 picks his i-th, all the ℓ − i items allocated to 2 by stage ℓ more preferred than a i . Then agent 2 is always busy getting more preferred items and agent 1 get a i in his i-th pick.
We prove that (ii) implies (iii). Now assume that in some picking stage ℓ in which agent 1 picks his i-th item (a i ), not all the ℓ − i items allocated to 2 by stage ℓ are more preferred than a i . But this means that 2 would have picked a i already by stage ℓ.
Lemma 3 (Proposition 9 of Bouveret and Lang [3] ). For two agents, lexicographic best response is polynomial-time computable.
Proof. Let us assume that the preferences of the manipulator are o 1 , o 2 , . . . , o m . We set the target set S to empty and O ′ to O. Take the most preferred item o ∈ O ′ and check whether S ∪ {o} is achievable by 1. If yes, we append o to S. In either case we delete o from O ′ . We continue in this fashion until O ′ is empty. For n = 2, it can be easily checked whether a given subset S of items is achievable by letting agent 1 express the items in S in the same order of preferences as agent 2's preferences over S. This follows from Lemma 1.
Next, we see that for n = 2, the outcome of any best response is the same for the manipulator. The argument of Bouveret and Lang [5] works as it is directly for the case of two agents.
Lemma 4 (Lemma 1 of Bouveret and Lang [5] ). Let A and B be achievable by agent 1. Let a = max ≻1 ((A \ B) ∪ (B \ A)) and assume that a ∈ A. Let b = max ≻1 (B \ A). Then B ∪ {a} \ {b} is achievable for agent 1.
Based on the lemmas above, the following theorem can be proved.
Theorem 2 (Bouveret and Lang [4, 5] ). For n = 2, there exists a polynomialtime algorithm to compute a best response. Furthermore the allocation of responding agent as a result of the best response is unique.
Proof. From Lemma 4, we know that in order to compute a best response for a given utility function consistent with the ordinal preferences, it is sufficient to compute the best response for any utility function consistent with the ordinal preferences. We know from Lemma 3 that there exists a polynomial-time algorithm to compute the best response for lexicographic utilities. Corollary 1. For n = 2, there exists a polynomial-time algorithm to verify a pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof. If there exists a polynomial-time algorithm to compute a best response, it can be used to compute the best response of each agent. A profile is in pure Nash equilibrium if and only if the best response of each agent yields at most the same utility as the preference reported in the given preference profile.
Conclusions
In this paper, we showed that computing a best response under sequential allocation to maximize additive utility is NP-hard. The result is surprising because previously it has been claimed in the literature (COMSOC 2014 and ECAI 2014) that the problem admits a polynomial-time algorithm. Our NPhardness result does not involve a constant number of agents. It remains an interesting open problem whether manipulating sequential allocation is NP-hard when the number of agents is three or some other constant.
